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Introduction
Should a central bank accommodate energy price shocks? Should the central bank use core inflation or headline inflation with its volatile energy component if it follows a Taylor rule?
In order to answer these questions we study a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with energy price shocks in the presence of money, nominal rigidities and durable goods investment. Additionally, this model has energy use at both the firm and the household level as in Dhawan and Jeske (2006) . We introduce a generalized Taylor rule that explicitly distinguishes between core and energy price inflation. We use this model to study the effects of an energy price shock on the economy in the presence of alternative parameterizations of the monetary policy rule.
We find that the central bank cannot completely shield the economy from an energy price spike. However, a central bank using core inflation explicitly in its Taylor rule does better than the one using headline inflation because the output drop is less severe. In general, we show that the lower the weight on the energy price inflation in the Taylor rule, the lower the impact is of energy price shocks on GDP and inflation. This result appears contrary to conventional wisdom in monetary economics, whereby a policy that accommodates oil price shocks is actually counterproductive, as in Leduc and Sill (2004) who state that "[e]asy inflation policies are seen to to amplify the impacts of oil price shocks on output and inflation"(p. 806). However, our result is not contradicting the previous research. In fact, we replicate the results in Leduc and Sill (2004) that with low levels of nominal rigidities, a policy rule with more weight on the output gap or a lower weight on the core inflation exacerbates the output drop and the inflation spike following an energy price hike. 1 We simply show that the central bank can "accommodate" inflation as long as that refers to energy price inflation only.
Our results also vindicate the work of Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) who claim that the Federal Reserve should have been less aggressive in responding to energy price hikes in the 1970s, which would have stabilized inflation without jeopardizing economic growth. Their paper was criticized for its reduced-form vector auto-regressions (VARs) methodology, that is subject to the Lucas Critique because any change in the monetary policy rule would trigger a change in the underlying parameters of that VAR model. 2 Our model, however, shows that even within a rational expectations framework the central bank can indeed accommodate an inflationary shock as long as the accommodation comes in the form of low or even negative weights on the energy price inflation while staying vigilant on core inflation. 1 However, we do show that with more wage and price rigidity we can reverse that result. Specifically, the output drop under easy monetary policy (lower weight on inflation or higher weight on the output gap) can cushion the output drop. 2 Zha (1999) and Hamilton and Herrera (2004) also criticize their VARs for misspecification.
Our results are similar in spirit to the work of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006a) who show that temporarily accommodating an energy price hike softens the output drop. This policy is not counter-productive the way Leduc and Sill (2004) showed, because the the central bank leaves the coefficients in the Taylor rule unchanged but temporarily deviates from the rule. The difference between our work and Carlstrom and Fuerst is that we incorporate the accommodation explicitly through an additional term for energy price inflation in the Taylor rule. 3 Following Leduc and Sill (2004) , the nominal rigidities on the consumer side are modeled in the form of a cash in advance constraint with adjustment costs for changing nominal wages.
On the producer side, firms in the intermediate goods sector face adjustment costs for their nominal price. Also, firms have to borrow funds to finance their payroll. A major difference from Leduc and Sill's specification is that we introduce durable goods investment and energy use at the household level as in Dhawan and Jeske (2006) . Another feature of our model is that we introduce energy use directly in the production function where capital and energy are complements, as in Kim and Loungani (1992) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006a) , unlike Leduc and Sill (2004) who tie energy use to capacity utilization.
As in Dhawan and Jeske (2006) , the drop in GDP after an energy price hike is smaller in an economy with durable goods than in one without them. This is due to a portfolio rebalancing effect whereby the representative consumer lowers durables investment more than fixed investment, which cushions the drop in output. We can see a flavor of this rebalancing action in Figure 1 , which plots empirical impulse response functions (IRFs) after a one standard deviation shock to the energy price. 4 Durable goods investment drops immediately after the energy price shock while fixed investment actually increases slightly for a while and then drops and by a lower magnitude than durable goods investment. 5 We show that this rebalancing effect plays a major role in our results. Specifically, we show that a Taylor rule with headline inflation impedes this rebalancing and thus causes larger output drops. In contrast, if the central bank puts a low (potentially negative) weight on energy inflation it enhances the rebalancing and thus cushions the drop in output.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, section 3 goes through the calibration and estimation used to parameterize our model, section 4 shows the numerical results, both in the baseline economy as well as under different policy rules and section 5 concludes.
Model

Households
There is a measure one of households indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] . Households have preferences over consumption and hours given by:
where C A i,t is a consumption aggregator and H i,t are hours worked. C A consists of three goods; nondurables and services excluding energy (N ), the flow of services from the stock of durables goods (D) and energy use (E h ). We write the period t utility function as following:
where ϕ ∈ (0, 1) and H denotes hours worked. This log-utility specification is the same as in Kim and Loungani (1992) .
As in Dhawan and Jeske (2006) we choose the following functional form for the aggregator function to combine these three types of consumption into C A :
Notice the timing of the durables stock. We index each variable by the time period its level was set. The stock of durables evolves according to:
where I d,i,t denotes durables investment. Households face an adjustment cost when changing durable goods investment:
In the labor market households are monopolistically competitive. Total labor services H t available to the production sector are aggregated across households via:
As usual this generates a downward sloping demand curve for household i labor services:
where W i,t is the household specific wage and W t aggregates the individual wages via:
Alternatively we can write equation (7) as:
Thus real labor income is:
Let P t be the core price level in period t and π t = P t /P t−1 be the gross core inflation rate.
Households face an adjustment cost AC w for changing the nominal wage:
whereπ is steady state inflation. Households begin every period with M i,t−1 dollars carried over from last period. They make a deposit of DP i,t at the intermediary and use the remaining money balance to finance all consumption expenditures. This induces the cash in advance constraint:
where P e t is the relative price of energy. Notice that our definition of core price is slightly different from what is normally used in that the food component included in N is part of our core price. Food prices, of course, are excluded in the both the core PCE deflator and the core CPI index. Since most of the variance in headline inflation is due to energy rather than food price fluctuations, however, we argue that our core index is a good enough approximation for the real world core price index. 6 6 For example, the correlation between PCE ex food and energy and PCE ex energy was 0.9637 between 1970Q1 and 2006Q4. What's more, food prices have become less volatile over time: between the years 2000 and 2006, food price fluctuations account for only about 1.4 percent of the variation in the difference between core and headline inflation.
Real money holdings evolve according to:
where Π f i,t is the real dividend from the firm and Π b i,t is the nominal dividend from the financial intermediary. Also notice that the deposits that the household made at the beginning of the period pay off at the end of the period, including interest. They add to the end-of period money stock.
We can now write the consumer problem as:
Financial Intermediary
As in Leduc and Sill (2004) , the financial intermediary takes deposits from households, receives money injections X t from the central bank and loans funds to the firm. That way the money injection including interest is passed on to households as the dividend:
Firms
We assume that all goods are produced in one single sector. 7 The final good Y t is produced in a competitive market by aggregating intermediate goods Y j,t of a measure one of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The aggregator over intermediate goods is:
The aggregate price level is:
and the demand for firm j output is:
where P i,t is the intermediate goods price and P t aggregates the individual prices via:
The price as a function of firm j supply is:
In what follows, when we talk about firms we mean the intermediate goods producers, not the final output producer. Firms can adjust the price of their output but face an adjustment cost:
Each firm j produces its output Y j,t with the following production function as in Dhawan and Jeske (2006) :
where Z is an aggregate shock to productivity, H j are hours employed in production, K j,t−1 is
capital and E f,j,t is firm energy use. 8
Capital evolves according to:
where I k,j,t stands for firm j's fixed capital investment. Just like households, firms have to pay an adjustment cost to change their level of investment:
Firms borrow money from the intermediary to pay for their wage bill. The total dividend in real terms is then:
The objective function of the firm is:
subject to:
The pricing kernel β t λ B t is the Lagrange multiplier on the consumer budget constraint (in real terms). That is, the firm discounts its profits at the marginal utility of dividends on the consumer side.
Aggregate Resource Constraint
The aggregate resource constraint is:
enter the production function.
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule with interest rate persistence. We model the Taylor rule in a sightly more general way as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) , to accommodate more general interest rate rules. Specifically, we allow the central bank to use not just core inflation π t = Pt P t−1 but also headline inflation in its interest rate rule. Notice that we can express headline CPI as:
where
is the price change of the relative energy price and χ e = P e E h N +I d +P e E h is the steady state share of of energy expenditures for consumers. Also notice that in the steady state, only the nominal price P t grows at a positive rate, not the relative energy price P e , thereforeπ e = 0.
Then we use the generalized Taylor rule with an additional term for energy price inflation:
This setup is similar in spirit to Gertler (1999, 2001 ) who add an extra term for the asset price to study the role of monetary policy in response to asset price shocks. Notice that with this equations we can accommodate a wide variety of Taylor rules. The rule used in Leduc and Sill (2004) is a special case if we set τ e π = 0. Likewise, if we set τ core π = τ HL π and τ e π = χ e τ HL π the rule is equivalent to one where the central bank puts weight τ HL π on headline inflation.
Calibration and Estimation
A summary of all estimated and calibrated parameters is in Table 1 . 
Preferences and technology
One model period corresponds to one quarter, so we set the discount rate β at 0.99 as is standard in the literature. We also choose a labor share of 64 percent, thus α = 0.36. Both parameters α and β will remain unchanged for all the model specifications we consider in this paper.
We choose the same θ w , θ f parameters that govern the market power of firms and workers as in Huang et.al (2004) : θ w = 3, and θ f = 11. Furthermore, we pick the same CES parameter in the production function (ν h = −0.7) as in Kim and Loungani (1992) and Dhawan and Jeske (2006) . We also set the household CES parameter to ν h = −3.0, which Dhawan and Jeske found to match the volatility of household energy consumption in the data very well.
Next, in Table 2 we specify six moments observed in the data that our model is supposed to replicate. We refer to Dhawan and Jeske (2006) for the details on how we computed these moments. 9 The target moments pin down six more parameters η h , γ, η f , δ d , δ k and ϕ. Appendix Section C has all the details. 
Based on Dhawan and Jeske (2006).
Monetary Policy
For the benchmark case we use the same parameters as in Leduc and Sill (2004) , based on Orphanides (2001). Thus we set ρ r = 0.79, τ core π = 1.80, τ e π = 0.00, and τ y = 0.27. Moreover, since we target a steady state core inflation rate of about 2 percent per year, we setR = 1.015.
We will also consider alternative parameterizations of this monetary policy rule in Section 4.2.
Shocks
Just as Cooley and Prescott (1995) , we assume that log-TFP follows an AR(1) process:
where ρ z = 0.95 and ε z,t iid ∼ N (0, σ 2 z ) with σ z = 0.007. We assume that the energy price follows an ARMA(1,1) process:
and use the same estimates as in Dhawan and Jeske (2006) , reported in Table 3 . 
Adjustment costs
Note that the model with adjustment costs generates the Neo-Keynesian Phillips Curve:
where mc t is marginal cost. This is the same structure as under Calvo pricing where we get:
and υ is the probability of not adjusting prices. We pick the parameters for the adjustment costs for firms and workers in order to generate the same level of rigidity as in a Calvo price setting with an average contract length of four quarters. This is the commonly used contract length in the literature. 10 We find that on the firm side: we simulate the economy and set the adjustment cost parameters in order to match the second moments of the investment serios for durable and fixed investment which we found to be
We found that between 1970Q1 and 2006Q4 the volatility of HP-filtered investment were 0.0449 and 0.0526 for durables and fixed investment, respectively. We find that with
our model subjected to the TFP and energy price shocks generates exactly those volatilities.
To get a sense of the size of these adjustment costs we simulate an economy with 200,000 quarters and compute the ratios of adjustment costs over output. We report the results in Table 4 . Relative to output, the adjustment costs are small, especially for durables and fixed investment: Table 4 : Adjustment costs to output ratios (in percent) mean standard deviation 95th percentile
derive 23 equations guiding the dynamic behavior of the economy. We then run the program Dynare Version 3.0 to generate a first order approximation for the policy functions (see Collard and Juillard (2001) for the methodological details).
In Figure 2 , we study the effects a doubling of the energy price. Due to the ARMA(1,1) structure the peak in the energy price occurs in the second period after the shock. 11 We find that in this economy, output drops by about 4.3 percent in quarter 4. Inflation peaks at about 1.7 percent in the first period and then slowly decays over an extended period. Even after 40 quarters inflation is still at 0.7 percent above steady state. The federal funds rate jumps by about 1.0 percentage points and persistently stays above its steady state level. In fact, the interest rate is the most persistent among all series because it is not only responding to the persistent inflation shock, but also has additional persistence built in through the term ρ r = 0.79 in the Taylor rule.
The reason for the persistence in inflation is that the energy price shock causes a persistent increase in marginal cost for the firm. According to equation (36), inflation is the discounted sum of future marginal costs. The higher energy price has a direct effect on marginal cost. On top of that, the higher federal funds rate increases the costs for the labor input, which accounts for 64 percent of output. Thus, higher labor cost increase the marginal cost substantially.
Finally, as pointed out in Dhawan and Jeske (2006) , the investment series display a rebalancing effect, whereby the response of durables investment is stronger than the drop in fixed investment. 12 Specifically, durables investment drops sharply in the first period and fixed investment increases in the first quarter before dropping into negative territory.
Alternative monetary policy rules
Instead of solving for "the" optimal monetary policy as in Erceg et. al. (2000) , we study the effect of the benchmark and four variations of the monetary policy rule to determine their relative success in cushioning the effect from the hike in energy prices and their impact on inflation. In particular, we keep the interest rate persistence parameter ρ r constant at 0.79 and study alternative values for the parameters τ core π , τ e π and τ y . 13
Rule 1 -Benchmark: We use the benchmark Taylor rule as specified above: τ core π = 1.80, τ e π = 0.00 and τ y = 0.27 as in Leduc and Sill (2004) .
Rule 2 -Use headline inflation: This means we keep τ core π as in the benchmark and set:
where χ e is the steady state household energy purchases as a share of total household expenditures. In our calibration χ e = 0.0556, so we set:
τ e π = 0.0556 * 1.8 = 0.1002
Rule 3 -Accommodate energy inflation: Notice that we can also generate interest rate rules where the central bank "accommodates" the energy price shock. Specifically, we can set the energy inflation weight to a negative number. 14 We keep τ core π = 1.80 as in the baseline, but use a weight on the energy price changes of τ e π = −0.1002.
Rule 4 -Lower weight on core inflation: We lower the coefficient on inflation. Specifically, we set τ core π = 1.50.
Rule 5 -Higher weight on the output gap: We increase the coefficient on the output gap:
Simulating the our economy under the alternative specifications for the Taylor rule, we did not encounter any problems with indeterminacy. This result is consistent with Carlsrom et. al.
(2006) who showed, albeit in a slightly different model setup, that the Taylor principle is robust to using different definitions of inflation, namely core CPI or headline CPI. What is noteworthy, though, is that even with a negative weight on the energy portion of inflation, as under Rule 3, our equilibrium is still determinate. Table 5 summarizes the alternative monetary policy rules we study. We plot the impulse response functions for output, inflation and the federal funds rate under the benchmark and the four alternative monetary policy rules in Figure 3 .
We find that a central bank that uses headline inflation in the Taylor rule (Rule 2) causes a large drop in output, almost 9 percent in the first quarter. Over the whole transition, output is the lowest among the five policy rules we consider. In the first period, inflation is indeed slightly lower than in the benchmark but then it stays persistently above the benchmark level. The federal funds rate is above that in the under the Benchmark Taylor rule.
If the central bank accommodates the energy price shock through a negative weight on energy 14 Notice that π e t is the gross increase in the energy price relative to the core basket of goods, not the nominal gross increase in energy prices which would be π e t · π t . In the remainder of the paper when we refer to energy price inflation, we mean the change in the energy price relative to the core goods, i.e., π e t . price inflation (Rule 3), output stays above the steady state level for two quarters before dropping into negative territory. 15 Along the transition path back to the steady state, output is consistently above that of the benchmark Taylor rule. Core inflation spikes at about 2 percent above steady state, though for one period only. After that, inflation is the lowest among the five policy rules.
With regards to monetary policy, despite higher core inflation in the first period, the federal funds rate barely increases due to the negative weight on energy inflation. After that both the interest rate persistence and the low core inflation keep the federal funds rate the lowest among the five policy rules.
Finally, we find that putting a low weight on core inflation (Rule 4) or a high weight on the output gap (Rule 5) cushions the output drop. In fact, in both cases output even increases slightly in the first quarter. But these two rules also cause higher core inflation and federal funds rates.
We conclude that in this economy using headline inflation in the Taylor rule is inferior both in terms of the output loss and core inflation. Altering the coefficients on core inflation and the output gap poses a tradeoff between inflation and output. Rule 3, which accommodates energy price shocks through a negative weight on the energy inflation component, is therefore unique in that it cushions both inflation and the output loss. In other words, the central bank can accommodate the energy price shock without trading off higher inflation for it.
How is it possible that the central bank can get something for nothing? As Dhawan and Jeske (2006) point out, the rebalancing of durable and fixed capital plays a key role in the response to energy price shocks. We can show that different monetary policy rules have different effects on this rebalancing. In Figure 4 we plot the two investment series under three alternative specifications for the Taylor rule: The benchmark (Rule 1), using headline inflation (Rule 2) and
Accommodating energy inflation (Rule 3). We find that the Taylor rule with headline inflation discourages rebalancing. Both IRFs are lower than under the benchmark but the effect is much stronger for fixed investment. A side effect of the negative wealth effect is that households work more during the initial two quarters. See Figure 5 where we plot the response to the doubling in the energy price in hours and the wage. Under Rule 3 we observe the largest increase in hours in the initial periods.
The drop in the real wage W in the first quarter is also more pronounced under Rule 3. This is because of the spike in inflation. Households have a harder time time passing on the core price increase into higher wages because of the nominal rigidity. After the initial period however, the wage under Rule 3, while below steady state, stays above that under Rules 1 and 2. This is clearly due to smaller drop in the fixed capital stock along the transition path which makes labor more productive.
For firms the increase in the energy price has a negative effect, but under Rule 3 it is cushioned substantially. The large increase in hours coupled with lower wages makes capital more productive. Indeed the increase in labor input more than makes up for the decline in firm energy use to cause an initial spike in fixed investment. A higher federal funds rate means higher costs to finance the wage bill, but notice that the federal funds rate increases only mildly in the first two quarters, only about a quarter percentage point and thus much less than under the other Taylor rules. The lower wage more than compensates for that.
Robustness check
In this section we study how our results change under different specifications of the basic model structure. Specifically, we perform robustness analysis with respect to the parameters outside of the Taylor rule, for example the persistence of the energy price shock or the degree of nominal rigidities. We consider a total of seven calibrations (including the benchmark calibration) and
in each case study the five different Taylor rule parameterizations outlined in Subsection 4.2.
Thus, we solve for impulse response functions in a total of 35 different economies and in each case compare both the cumulative output loss and the impact on inflation.
As a measure of the output loss we use:
whereỹ t is the impulse response function, i.e., the log deviation from the steady state. One can think of L y as translating the time-varying output loss in the impulse response function into one constant permanent loss in every period. We present the results in Table 6 , where the columns correspond to the alternative monetary policy rules. The first column is the benchmark Taylor rule and the four additional columns are for the alternative parameterizations, as discussed in We also compare the inflation path across the different calibrations and Taylor rules. Our measure of the total impact on inflation is:
whereπ t is the inflation log-deviation from its steady state. The term P L is the total change in the price level due to the energy price shock and subsequent monetary policy response. In other words, 1 + P L is the factor by which we multiply the exponentially growing price level in an economy without an energy price shock. We report these results in Table 7 .
Since our main focus will be how accommodation of energy prices affects macroeconomic outcomes, we also report the success of Rule 3 in reducing the output drop and the inflation impact relative to the benchmark Taylor rule 1. Specifically, Table 8 No wage rigidity: Without wage rigidity the cumulative impact on output is larger than under the benchmark calibration. The ordering in output losses and inflation impact between rules 1 through 3 is unchanged, though. As before, Rule 2 performs the worst among these three rules and Rule 3 performs the best. What does change between the benchmark calibration and the economy without wage rigidity is that now the output drop under rules 4 and 5 is larger than under the benchmark Taylor rule. There is no tradeoff any more: Being easy on core inflation (Rule 4) of the output gap (Rule 5) exacerbates the output drop and causes more inflation. This is the same result as in Leduc and Sill (2004) who showed that lower weights on core inflation or higher weights on the output gap cause larger output drops and higher inflation than in the benchmark Taylor rule.
No price rigidity: Qualitatively the results are the same as in the case of no wage rigidity.
The ordering between rules 1 through 3 is the same as before and rules 4 and 5 cause larger output drops and inflation.
No wage, no price rigidity: Without any nominal rigidities, i.e., with zero adjustment costs for both wages and prices we maintain the ordering between Rules 1 through 3 for both output drop and inflation.
We also find that rules 4 and 5 are most damaging in the economy without nominal rigidities.
Notice that this economy is most similar to that of Leduc and Sill (2004) . Our robustness analysis shows that along a wide variety of alternative calibrations, the lower the weight on energy inflation in the Taylor rule the lower is the output drop and the inflation impact. Specifically, using headline inflation, which implies a positive weight on energy price inflation, exacerbates the output loss and inflation impact relative to the benchmark Rule 1, while 0.6930 0.7762 0.6097 0.9941 0.8626 Note: A value of 0.8195 in row 1, column 2 means that in the benchmark calibration with the Taylor rule 2 (with headline inflation), a doubling of the energy price drives the core price level 81.95 percent higher in the long term.
Rule 3, which accommodates energy price inflation, cushions the drop and the price increase.
This result seems to come mainly from the rebalancing effect, because the only case in which the choice of the inflation measure in the Taylor rule does not matter much, is when the model lacks the choice between durable and fixed investment.
We also confirm Leduc and Sill's (2004) result that with low levels of nominal rigidities the central bank exacerbates the output loss following an energy price hike by choosing a low weight on core inflation or a high weight on the output gap. However, we show that this result is not all that robust. For higher levels of nominal rigidities we can reverse this finding. Specifically, if we use adjustment cost parameters that correspond to commonly used degrees of Calvo-type price stickiness -price and wage adjustments are done on average only every four quarters -we find that a central bank accommodating an energy price hike can cushion the output drop, though at the cost of a higher increase in the price level. 
Conclusion
Which inflation measure should the central bank focus on in its Taylor rule, core or headline?
To answer this question we clearly need a model with energy price shocks, since a large part of the difference between the two measures comes from the volatile energy price series. We set up a model with money, durable goods, nominal rigidities and energy price shocks to study how the economy behaves under different monetary policy rules after being subjected to an energy price hike. Specifically, we allow a generalized functional form for the Taylor rule that includes a term for energy price inflation in addition to core inflation and the output gap. Clearly, a central bank using headline inflation is a special case of this rule.
A negative weight on energy price inflation, which we view as accommodating the energy price shock, cushions the output drop while actually allowing a lower price increase than under the benchmark Taylor rule. We conclude that a central bank can in fact accommodate an energy price shock, as long as the accommodation refers to energy prices only, while still being vigilant on core inflation. Conversely, using headline inflation in a Taylor rule appears to be a bad idea, both in terms of the output drop and the inflation impact. This result is robust along a wide variety of alternative calibrations. Only in the absence of household durable goods would the weight on energy price inflation be irrelevant. This indicates that the rebalancing between durable and fixed capital investment plays the key role in explaining the differential impacts of monetary policy. Thus, we found a new application of the rebalancing effect of Dhawan and Jeske (2006) , namely in the transmission of monetary policy following an energy price shock. In the first order conditions we skip the expectation operator when referring to t + 1 variables to save on notation. Assume the cash in advance constraint binds. Then the Lagrangian for the consumer is
• Energy E h,i,t :
• Deposits:
• Hours H i,t :
Thus:
• Plus the constraints and the definition of C A .
We can assume that in a symmetric equilibrium W i,t = W t , H i,t = H t , N i,t = N t and so on. Also, we eliminate multiplier λ C :
Then the Consumer First Order Conditions become
• Non-Durables:
• Durables:
• Energy:
• Investment:
• Money holdings and deposits
• Hours:
Equations to be fed into Dynare Since we want all endogenous variables in Dynare to be stationary we define
We also plug in for the partial derivatives of the adjustment cost functions. See Appendix D for the derivation.
• Durables investment:
• Productivity:
• Energy price: log P e t = ρ 0 e log P e t−1 + ε p,t + ρ 1 e ε p,t−1 (A-57)
• Money rule:
We have the following variables:
• 10 consumer variables: • Non-Durables:
Then through equations (B-12) and (B-15) we get the steady state wage
From equations (B-1) and (B-3)
From the durables vs. non-durables equation (equations (B-2) and (B-1)):
Next, rewrite the nondurables and energy equation as:
Then rewrite the resource constraint (B-19) as:
Then:
Notice that so far we have not used a particular functional form for the utility function. Now we can calculate κ N = N Y as κ N = N D κ D (B-40)
On the consumer side there is one more equation left over:
Assume that u takes the form:
Also:
Then: 
On the household side we can easily determine δ d from the calibration targets
The durables Euler equation:
From energy vs. nondurables:
and plug into equation (C-5):
Solve for η h :
In equation (C-7) we solve for γ :
Finally, combine the labor supply equation:
to get:
D Partial Derivatives of adjustment cost functions
Drop the i and j subscripts to simplify notation
and the partial derivatives are:
and
Adjustment cost for durables investment:
In a symmetric equilibrium:
The partial derivatives of adjustment cost with respect to production factors:
Likewise:
And now for leading adjustment costs:
And finally for capital:
